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ABSTRACT 
The driving error of improper speed has been identified as a leading 
cause of traffic crashes and associated losses. Excessive speed is 
particullarly prevalent in fatal and other serious crashes. Society has taken 
formal action to control the crash risk posed by speeding; the earliest such 
response and the one most used today is the legal approach that rests on 
the corlcept of deterrence. In most jurisdictions criminal or criminal-like 
procedures are used to enforce speeding laws: police officers are deployed 
to obse!rve for speeders; suspected violators are pursued and apprehended; 
and offenders are referred to judicial or administrative tribunals to 
determine guilt or innocence. A variety of patrol configurations, vehicles, 
and speed-measuring devices (chiefly radar) are used by police agencies to 
enforce speeding laws. Speed enforcement as currently carried out is labor 
intensive and costly, principally because legal requirements stemming from 
the use of criminal law and procedures must be followed. For traditional 
enforcement procedures to effectively deter speeding, large increases in 
funds and personnel would be required. Therefore, strategies other than 
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MANAGING THE SPEED CRASH RISK 
INTRODUCTION 
The familiar expression, "speed kills," reflects society's com mon 
knowledge that speed is one of the major factors that produces highway 
crashes and associated losses such as casualties and property damage. Th'e 
speed~er has been the target of societal action almost as long as the 
automobile has been in use. Speeding continues to be the leading category 
of trrlffic offenses cited by the police; an estimated 1 0  to 20 million 
speeding citations are issued annually. Speeding has gained even wider 
attention in recent years, now that the national 55-mph speed limit has 
achieved relative permanence and speed enforcement efforts have become 
increasingly visible. 
Despite the attention that speeding has received, thousands of deaths 
and miillions of traffic crashes-accounting for social costs totaling billions 
of dolllars--still result from speeding. The purpose of this paper is to 
define the relationship between inappropriate speed and traffic crashes; 
describe society's response to the crash risk created by speeding; evaluate 
current approaches to managing the speed-crash risk; and offer suggestions 
to improve the management of this risk. 
THE :RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN SPEED AND TRAFFIC CRASHES 
A recent clinical study of traffic crash causation, conducted by a 
research team at Indiana University and reported by Treat and associates 
in 197'7, found that human factors play at least a possible role in causing 
more than 90 percent of all traffic crashes. Their analyses showed that 
excessive speed was one of the most frequent of specific errors, and that 
inapprlopriate speed may have played a part in other specific driving errors. 
St a t  is t ical studies comparing crashed and noncrashed drivers likewise link 
improper speeds and traffic crashes: the more a vehicle's speed differs 
from the average speed of traffic on a road, the more likely it is that it 
will be involved in a crash. 
Speed can be measured objectively by external observers; thus society 
can intervene in the form of laws and other actions designed to influence 
drivers not to drive at unsafe speeds. One requirement for social action 
directed at speeding is to know what kind of speeding is most often 
associated with crashes in general, what kind produces the greatest crash 
losses, and what drivers most often speed. Effective efforts to control 
speed and reduce crashes must be based on a sound understanding of the 
relationship between speed and crashes. Both clinical and statistical 
studies define the relationship between speed and the risk of having a 
traffic crash. 
Statistical Studies Relating Speed and Crash Risk 
A statistical study of the relationship between speed and crash risk 
typically involves comparing the speeds of crashed vehicles with the speeds 
of a sample of noncrashed vehicles using the same road under like 
circumstances. 
Perhaps the most comprehensive statistical study was conducted by 
Solomon in the late 1950s and reported in 1964, In Solomon's study, speed 
and crash data were collected for 600 miles of main rural highways at 35 
sites in eleven states. Solomon's measure of risk was the number of crash 
involvements per 100 million miles of travel at a given speed. Vehicle 
speeds were measured with respect to the mean travel speed of all traffic 
on the selected highway segment; for example, if the mean speed was 60 
miles per hour and a given vehicle was found to be traveling at 70 miles 
per hour, the 10 mph positive differential was the relevant statistic. For 
noncrashed vehicles, speeds were determined through spot speed checks; for 
crashed vehicles, speeds were determined by examining police accident 
reports. The locations a t  which Solomon measured the speeds of 
noncrashed vehicles were selected to correspond to those locations where 
crashes occurred. 
Solomon's major finding from these data was that the greater the 
differential between a vehicle's speed and the average speed of all traffic, 
the greater the chance of that vehicle's being involved in a crash. The 
lowest crash involvement rate occurred a t  the mean travel speed or 
slightly above it; as speeds departed from the mean in either direction, the 
crash involvement rate increased in a nearly symmetrical fashion. The U- 
shaped curves relating speed differential to crash frequency are depicted in 
Figurea 1 and 2. From those curves, i t  can be seen that the crash 
involvement rate increases very rapidlv as deviations from the mean 
speed become large. For example, the daytime crash involvement rate 
for vel?icles traveling 37 miles per hour below the mean speed is about 500 
times the rate for vehicles traveling at the daytime mean speed. Both 
daytime and nighttime data show increases in involvement rate as speed 
deviations from the mean increase. 
From Solomonls data two findings are significant. First of all, even 
though speeding is  usually thought of only in terms of excess ive  
speeds, too-slow driving: i s  also identified as risky behavior. The 
data indicate that negative deviations from the average speed are at least 
as likely to result in a traffic crash as equal positive deviations. The 
apparent risk posed by slow speed is indicated by Solomon's cumulative 
data (:Figure 3). They show that the crash involvement rate for speeds 
less th~an the 5th percentile (i.e., the slowest five percent of traffic) was 
2,915 crashes per 100 million miles traveled, or about eighteen times more 
risky than driving faster than the 95th percentile (the fastest five percent), 
for which the involvement rate was 165 crashes per 100 million miles. 
The involvement rate for all speeds below the 95th percentile was 254 
crashes per 100 million miles, about fifty percent higher than the rate for 
speeds above the 95th percentile. These data suggest that the slowest 
speeds pose an especially great crash risk. 
The second finding from Solomon's data, when plotted on a curve, is 
that  a "rightward shiftt1 from the mean occurs: The lowest crash 
involvement rate occurs some five to ten miles per hour above the mean 
travel speed. In fact, Figure 2 shows that the lowest involvement rate 
occurs at the 95th percentile speed, indicating that nearly all drivers keep 
their speed below that which would minimize their probability of having a 
FIGURE 1 
CRASH INVOLVEMENT RATE 
VERSUS DEVIATION FROM AVERAGE S P E E D  
DAY AND N I G H T  
SOURCE : Sol  omon (1 964) 
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crash. Those data show that half of Solomonts drivers drove so slowly that 
their crash risk was at least fifty percent higher than the minimum, and 
five percent drove so slowly that their crash risk was well over five times 
the minimum. By comparison, only a negligible number of drivers drove so 
fast that they exposed themselves to correspondingly high levels of risk. 
Thus Solomonts data might indicate, at first impression, that most drivers 
drive too slow. 
However, when Solomon's serious crash data are examined separately, a 
different relationship between speed and crash involvement rate em ewes. 
As Figure 4 shows, Solomonts U-shaped curves "shift to the lefttt with 
inerewing crash severity until, for fatal crashes, the point of symmetry is 
close to, and possibly even to the left of, the mean speed of traffic. The 
risk of a fatal crash is as great when traveling above the 95th percentile 
speed as it is when traveling below the 5th percentile speed-in both cases 
the probability of being killed is about twice that of traveling at the mean 
speed. That the highest and lowest speeds are most risky is borne out by 
Solom,onts finding that 32 percent of all fatal crashes and 38 percent of all 
injuries occurred at speeds outside the 5th and 95th percentiles. 
Solomonts findings were generally confirmed by a later study conducted 
by the Research Triangle Institute (1970); however, the RTI study did not 
show the "rightward shiftu of the speed-crash involvement curve that 
appeclred in Solomonts study. In the RTI data, the minimum crash 
involvement rate  occurred a t  the mean travel speed, not above it. 
Another difference between the Solomon and RTI studies is that the latter 
study did not develop speed distribution data, so that it is not possible to 
determine whether the RTI data confirm Solomon's findings regarding: the 
relative risks of traveling above the 95th percentile and below the 5th 
percentile speeds. 
Clinical Studies Relating Speed and Crash Risk 
More recent studies of traffic crash causation have used the so-called 
t'clinic!al approachtt in which trained experts make a detailed investigation 
of individual crashes and make a determination of what causal factors 
so, 000 
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were present. The clinical approach complements the statistical approach: 
it specifies distinct causes of crashes, the prevalence of which can be 
confirbmed by statistical study. 
The most comprehensive clinical study of traffic crash causation is the 
Indiana Tri-Level Study of the Causes of Traffic Accidents, conducted 
between 1972 and 1977 in Monroe County (Bloomington), Indiana, and 
reported by Treat and associates in 1977. 
In the Tri-Level study, assessments of causation were based on data 
collected by researchers sent to the scene of crashes immediately after 
they occurred, These assessments were based on data collected at two 
different levels of detail: Level B data, obtained from on-site 
inve~~t igat ions;  and Level C data, based on independent in-depth 
investigations of a subset of the Level B crash'es by trained professionals. 
In the! Tri-Level study, a 'lcausal factortt was defined as a factor necessary 
or sufficient for a crash to occur. In other words, but for the occurrence 
of the factor, the crash would not have occurred. Three levels of 
conf idlence-definite, probable, and possible-were established and used in  
making judgments as to the causal role of a given factor. 
Factors were initially divided into three broad classes: human, vehicle, 
and environmental factors. The in-depth (Level C) data revealed that 
human factors were at least a possible causal factor in 93 percent of the 
crashe!~; environmental factors in 34 percent, and vehicular factors in 13 
percent. Human factors were then subclassified into specific categories; 
among these categories, excessive speed was a definite causal factor in 
seven to eight percent and at least a probable causal factor in 16 to 19 
percent of the crashes (see Table 1). I1Excessive speed" was defined in 
qualitative terms--greater than the speed that a person who drives to a 
high but reasonable standard of good defensive driving practice would 
choose under the conditions-rather than quantitative terms, that is, the 
posted or advisory speed limit. 
TABLE 1 
THE ROLE OF "EXCESSIVE SPEED" 
AS A CAUSAL FACTOR IN CRASHES 
% ACCIDENTS WITH 
DEGREE OF LEVEL OF EXCESSIVE SPEED 





PROBABLE OR C 
POSSIBLE B 
SOURCE: Trea t  et al. (1977) 
Jones, Treat, and Joscelyn (1981) examined the role of speed in traffic 
crashes reported in various other crash files. For the excessive-speed 
category, overall estimates of speed involvement (definition of the term 
vinvolvementll varied somewhat from file to file) ranged from the seven 
percent figure reported in the Tri-Level Study to twenty-five percent of 
all crashes; the data believed to provide the best indication yielded 
est imates in the range of 1 6  to 23 percent. The Indiana figure 
represented a conservative 71causal-certain" estimate by the technician 
teams; when probable and possible causal factors were added, the Indiana 
figure was fourteen to nineteen percent-an estimate consistent with that 
provicled by other files. 
When only fatal crashes were considered, rather than crashes of all 
severities, the involvement of excessive speed was found to be considerably 
higherb. Data gathered by the National Safety Council (19801, supplied by 
police departments in eleven states and 41 cities, indicated that excessive 
speed was cited as a driver error in 30 percent of all fatal crashes. The 
National Safety Council (1978) reported that data from the National 
Highway Traffic Safety Administration's Fatal Accident Reporting System 
(FARB) for 1976 indicated excessive speed in 37 percent of all vehicles 
involved in fatal crashes. Because the FARS data included crashes in 
which multiple vehicles were involved, the involvement rate was slightly 
less than the reported figure of 37 percent. In the Texas Fatal Accident 
File f'or 1976, speeding over the limit was indicated in 24 percent of all 
fatal crashes, and speeding too fast for conditions in an additional eight 
percent, for a total of 32 percent. In the Collision Performance and 
Injury Report file (Highway Safety Research Institute 1978a), speeding 
errors were found in 35 percent of the fatal cases. 
Although the 55-mph national maximum speed limit has been in effect 
since 1974, there are still little data regarding the involvement rate of 55- 
mph speed violations in crashes. Crash data from the state of Washington 
for 1978 indicate that one fifth of the speed-related crashes of all 
severities involved a 55-mph violation. The proportion of 55-mph cases 
was likely higher among fatal crashes involving excessive speed. 
With respect to speed too slow, clinical studies support but do not 
quantify the findings, of Solomon and RTI, that excessively slow speeds are 
a serious problem and that among reportable traffic crashes, speeds too 
slow were at  least as important as excessively high speeds. The highway 
safety literature canvassed by Jones, Treat, and Joscelyn (1981) revealed 
no clinical study that specifically examined the possibility or tested the 
contention that driving too slowly relative to other traffic is in fact the 
safety problem that the Solomon and RTI data would indicate. It is also 
possible that clinical studies cannot determine the involvement of slow 
speeds, Many instances of slow driving may be due to conditions over 
which the driver has little or no control, such as slowing to  turn, or 
slowing on account of pedestrians or other vehicles, rather than a 
discretionary and inadvisable choice of a slow speed. Then, too, slow 
driving mag lead to crashes by increasing the conflict rate, such as by 
forcing following traffic to pass the slow vehicle. It is likely that clinical 
studies can identify only the grosser cases of slow driving and thus 
underestimate the influence of this behavior. 
The Indiana study provides some indication as to the involvement of 
too-slow speeds in traffic crashes. One category of driving errors, 
"inadequately defensive driving technique-should have adjusted speed," 
appears to be at least a probable cause in four percent, and at least a 
possible cause in seven percent of all crashes. Too-slow travel by the lead 
vehicle is a possible factor among rear-end collisions, which constitute a 
substantial portion of all crashes. Crashes resulting from "improper 
overtakingt1-the National Safetv Council (1980) reports that 3,6 percent of 
all crashes (2.7 percent of fatal crashes) fell into this category-also may 
have been prompted by too-slow travel. Finally, delays in recognizing 
vehicles stopped or slowed ahead were cited as at least a probable cause 
of nine percent of all crashes in the Tri-Level study; many of these also 
could have stemmed from driving too slowly. Based on the limited data, 
Jones,, Treat, and Joscelyn (1981) estimated that discretionary decisions to 
travel too slowly play a causal role in as many as five to ten percent of 
all traffic crashes. 
Treat and associates (1980), who canvassed selected accident files, 
developed estimates of the involvement of speeding in traffic crashes. 
Table 2 presents ranges of possible involvement rates, and single-figure 
estimates of involvement, for all speeding and for specific types of 
speeding, 
CIRCUMSTANCES OF SPEEDING AND TRAFFIC CRASHES 
Ci~rcumstances of speeding include the driver, the environment, and 
characteristics of the crash itself. Studies have been conducted to 
determine the association of these circumstances with speeding when 
speeding is identified as a cause of a traffic crash. Primary sources of 
the drsta include the Collision Performance and Injury Report (CPIR) files 
maintained a t  the University of Michigan Highway Safety Research 
Institute (1978a), and the 1976 Texas Five Percent Sample files (Highway 
Safety Research Institute 1978b). Results of these studies are summarized 
in Table 3. 
Results are available for speed too fast only. In the Texas data, 
speeding is divided between speeding "over the limit" and speeding rltoo 
fast for conditions." The CPIR data classify all excessive speed violations 
together. 
What Kinds Of Crashes Are Related To Speeding? 
As indicated by the Solomon and RTI studies, as well as by the clinical 
study of Treat and associates, crashes involving excessive speed are more 
serious than crashes in general; that is, fatal and serious crashes are 
overrepresented among crashes involving excessive speed. In both the 
Texas and CPIR files, crashes involving speeding resulted in fatalities 
approximately twice as often as would have been expected based on the 
appearance of fatal crashes in the files as a whole. The Texas data 
TABLE 2 
ESTIMATES OF INVOLVEMENT 
OF SPEED IN ALL TRAFFIC CRASHES 
Range Indicated Single Figure 
By Selected Files Best Estimate 
Type of Speed UDA (% of all Crashes) (% of all Crashes) 
Too fast, absolute 
Too fast, relative 
Too slow, absolute 
Too slow, relative 
Too fast, all 











All Speed UDAs 14-48 
SOURCE: Treat e t  al. (1980) 
TABLE 3 
SUMMARY OF LARGEST AND MOST OVERREPRESENTED 
CATEGORIES OF DESCRIPTIONS FOR CRASHES 
INVOLVING "SPEEDING TOO FAST" 
DESCRIPTION MOST OVERREPRESENTED 
(Source) LARGEST CATEGORY@) CATEGORY(S) 
Severitly-Damage Minor-Moderate Damage Very Severe Damage 
(Texas 5%) (levels 1-3) 
Severity-Injury No Injury (72%) 
(Texiss 5%) 
Fatal 
Severi ty-Injury Minor Injury (43%) Severe Thru Fatal 
(CPIR) 
Single v. Multiple CPIR: evenly divided Single Vehicle 
Vehicle (CPIR & 
Texas 5%) Texas: over limit= Single Vehicle 
Single (61%) 
Texas: for cond. = Single Vehicle 
Multiple (61%) 
Configuration (CPIR) Nonmoving vehicle Nonmoving vehicle 
Intersecting (44%) Sideswipe, rear-end 





20-24 yrs. (25%) 10-14, 15-19, 20-24 yrs. 
Males (75%) Males 
Roadw(ay Class City Streets (44%) County Roads, State, 
(Texas 5%) U.S./State trunkline Secondary & Interstate1 
Turnpikes 
Roadway Lane 2-lane (53%) 
Configuration (CPIR) 
Road Alignment Straight & Level (89%) Curves, Hill, or Both 
(Texas 5%) 
Road Alignment-Horiz. Straight (61%) 
(CI?IR) 
Curve 
SOURCE: Jones, Treat, and Joscelyn (1981) 
indicate that speeding over the limit is associated with a higher level of 
crash severity than speeding too fast for conditions, although both types of 
excessive speed are associated with increased levels of damage and injury. 
These findings are consistent with those reported by Treat et al. (197?), 
namely, that a greater proportion of personal-injury crashes occurred 
among crashes where tlexcessive speed1' was a factor. 
In  both the  Texas and CPIR files, single-vehicle crashes are 
overrepresented among those caused by speeding; this is true in the Texas 
data for both over-the-limit and too-f ast-for-conditions speeding. 
Regarding collision trajectory, the data show no clear pattern. 
"Sideswipet1 crashes are the most overrepresented, but these constitute onlv 
a small proportion of all crashes. Rear-end crashes a re  slightly 
overrepresented, and so are head-on crashes--a surprising finding. 
Intersection-type crashes, which make up the largest category of crashes, 
are underrepresented among the speed-related collisions. 
Where Do Speed-Related Crashes Occur? 
While speed-related crashes occur everywhere, the roadway class most 
overrepresented among speed-related crashes were county roads, interstate 
highways, turnpikes, and state secondary roads. On the basis of roadway 
lane configuration, divided highwa ys were overrepresented: on the other ' 
hand, nondivided highways with four or more lanes were underrepresented- 
a finding that could be attributable to the confounding influence of traffic 
density, since most multilane undivided highways are found in urban areas 
where traffic is dense. 
8 
Classifying by terrain,  crashes occurring on curves and hills are 
overrepresented among the crashes; however, most crashes (nearly 90  
percent) occurred on straight roadways on level terrain, and thus the 
speeding problem manifests itself under all types of terrain and road 
alignment. 
When do Speed-Related Crashes Occur? 
Data files examined by Treat (1980) show that with respect to time of 
day, speed-related crashes are most overrepresented at night, especially 
between 1 and 4 a.m. With respect to road and weather conditions, 
speeding was overrepresented in the CPIR file under conditions of rain and 
snow and when the road surface was reported as llslippery.ll While there is 
no distinction drawn between speed over the limit and speed too fast for 
conditions in the CPIR file, it is likely that precipitation-related crashes 
appeared more frequently in the too-fast-for-conditions category. 
Who Are The Speeders? 
When the crashed drivers involved in speed-related collisions were 
examined with respect to sex, males were found to overrepresented among 
over-the-limit speeders by a factor of about 1.2 in the Texas data and to 
a lesiser extent among the too-fast-for-conditions speeders. Males 
accounted for high proportions of crash-involved drivers as a whole because 
they are  more frequently found on the roads, but they  were  
overrepresented among speeding, crashed drivers. In the Texas data, 83 
percent of the crashed drivers judged to be speeding over the limit were 
male, 
With respect to age, younger drivers were overrepresented among the 
crashed population. In the Texas data, drivers under the age of fifteen 
were the most overrepresented in both the over-the-limit and too-fast-for- 
condi1:ions categories. Drivers aged fifteen to nineteen years, and twenty 
to twenty-four years, respectively, were the next most overrepresented 
classe!~. Drivers under 25 years of age comprised 56 percent of all over- 
the-limit drivers, compared to 48 percent of the too-fast-for-conditions 
drivers and 37 percent of all crashed drivers. The data gathered by Treat 
and associates (1977) confirm the involvement of young drivers in speed- 
related crashes: the Tri-Level Study data show that drivers under the age 
of twenty were judged to have exceeded the limit more than twice as 
often as crashed drivers aged twenty and above. 
Why Do Drivers Speed? 
It is known that some unsafe driving behaviors are conscious and 
intentional, while others--such as inat tention or distraction--are not 
primarily the products of the driver's conscious decision. CPIR files 
examined by Treat and associates (1980), to determine the reasons for 
speeding, included forty-four cases in which speed caused a crash to occur, 
It was found that in the great majority (34 of 41, or 83 percent) of the 
cases examined, excessive speed was the result of a conscious and 
intentionally undertaken behavior, The remaining cases revealed 
impairment, principally by alcohol, as the reason for the speeding, Both 
over-the-limit and too-fast-for-conditions speeding was found to be 
overwhelmingly conscious and intentional--79 percent and 92 percent, 
respectively, Lack of an adequate number of speed-too-slow cases in the 
CPIR files prevented a comparable assessment; however, all three speed 
too-slow cases that were found and examined involved conscious and 
intentional decisions to drive too slowly. That most speeders intentionally 
drive too fast is substantiated by surveys in which drivers cite reasons for 
committing violations. Behind most of these reasons is an expressed need 
to get to some destination more quickly, for example, because the driver 
is on a long trip, late, or "in a hurry.ll Other reasons include ''trying outff 
a new car, following the flpacetf set by other traffic, and simply flshowing 
off." Researchers are currently examining in more depth the reasons why 
drivers speed, and why other drivers obey posted limits, 
Because inapproprate speed increases the risk of a traffic crash and 
associated losses, society has taken formal action to reduce the crash risk 
to a level that it considers acceptable. As in the case of other traffic 
crash risks, society's primary strategy has been to use the legal system to 
deal with unacceptably risky speeds. The legal system relies on the 
~rinciole of deterrence to manage the speed crash risk: a driver who is 
caught engaging in risky behavior is punished (usually by a fine or license 
suspension), The punishment is intended to prevent the driver from 
committing future violations, and to discourage other drivers who are not 
punished. Punishment or the threat of punishment is a negative 
consequence of speeding that a driver weighs against its positive 
consequences, such as saving travel time. It is intended that punishment, 
actual or threatened, will provide enough of a "surrogate risk," in addition 
to the actual risks of a crash and increased cost of operating a vehicle, to 
cause a driver to decide against speeding. The legal strategy, one of 
increasing the disutility of speeding, is society's most common strategy 
for rnanaging the risk of inappropriate speeds. Other risk-management 
strategies, such as incentives to nonspeeders, are also available to society. 
The legal approach to the speed crash risk begins with a definition of 
what behavior is prohibited. The definition process with respect to speed 
parallels that of other unsafe driving behaviors, such as driving while 
impaired by alcohol and following too closely, where the crash risk varies 
in proportion to some numerical value. For example, studies of the 
alcohol crash risk have shown that crash risk becomes unacceptablv high at 
blood alcohol concentrations above . l o %  w/v, and legislation has been 
enactled that prohibits vehicle operation at BACs above this level. By the 
same token, speed limits have evolved from a determination of what 
speeds present an unacceptably high risk. 
SOCTETY'S RESPONSE TO THE SPEED-CRASH RISK 
A legal definition of speed, or of any other unsafe driving behavior, 
must allow an external observer of traffic to determine whether an unsafe 
driving action has occurred, and should lend itself to detection using low- 
cost, readily available, and nonobtrusive technology. The definition should 
be tied to the amount of risk (probability of causing a traffic crash; and 
the severity of the crash should one occur) resulting from unsafe driving, 
and slhould take into account the driver's conscious decision-making process 
regartling whether to drive safely or unsafely. 
Researchers at the University of Michigan Highway Safety research 
Institute (HSRI) have refined earlier work (Lohman et al. 1976; Hiett et al. 
1975) defining the concept of unsafe driving acts, or UDAs. A UDA is an 
act or omission by a driver that increases the risk of a traffic crash above 
a level that is socially acceptable, observable, and flows from a driver's 
conscious decision to drive in an unsafe manner (Treat et al. 1980). 
With respect to speed, there are two definitions of speed UDAs. The 
first of these is the relative-speed UDA, the act of driving a vehicle at 
a speed that is so different from the speeds of other traffic that the risk 
of a crash becomes higher than socially acceptable. Preliminary data 
indicate that speeds less than the fifth percentile, or greater than the 95th 
percentile speed of traffic, are unacceptable. The second UDA is the 
absolute-speed UDA, the act of driving a vehicle faster than an 
appropriatelv established maximum speed limit or, in a normal driving 
environment (such as dry pavement, good visibility, no construction zones 
and normal traffic density), driving slower than an appropriately established 
minimum limit, The two UDAs as defined by HSRI are mutually exclusive; 
rules for deciding whether a speed UDA has occurred and, if so, what 
UDA it was, are set out in Table 4. 
The UDA definitions are applicable to, and also parallel to, the legal 
definitions of speed that have developed. They relate vehicle speed to 
crash risk, and permit observation of traffic to determine whether 
unacceptable risk has been created. Speed laws, discussed in this section, 
should be considered against the goal of risk management: legal sanctions 
are used to discourage driver decisions to drive in an unacceptably risky 
manner. 
Law Generation: Prohibition of Unsafe Speeds 
History of Speed Limits. Restrictions on speed were known even 
before the invention of the automobile. The first known "speed limittT in 
the United States was enacted in Newport, Rhode Island in 1678; i t  
prohibited riding horses at a gallop in the city streets (Ladd 1959). The 
first American speed limit applicable to automobiles was passed in 
Connecticut in 1901. It set a maximum urban speed limit of 8 mph, and a 
1 2  mph maximum elsewhere in the state (Labatut and Land 1 9 5 0 ) .  
Speeding was by far the driving offense of greatest public concern early in 
the twentieth century. Earlv attempts to control speed often were one 
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reason, traffic countermeasures from that era were often colorful and 
emotional, Many early speed limits were unreasonablv low and often 
punishable by severe sanctions. As the number of registered vehicles grew, 
public pressure increased for more reasonable speed restrictions and a 
focus on reckless driving rather than on speed per se (Joscelyn and Elston 
1970). 
By 1930 two separate and opposing theories of speed control had 
evolved, One theory stressed that road and weather conditions, and other 
circumstances, varied so widely that no single limit was feasible; under 
that theory, the proposed remedy was a general law prohibiting speeds that 
were not "reasonable and prudent." The opposing theory found the 
?'reasonable and prudent" standard too vague and relying too much on the 
driver's judgment. It led to the recommendation of a fixed limit instead 
(Taylor 1930). The "reasonable and prudentv standard survives in the form 
of "basic speed laws1? that are found in most states; these supplement the 
absolute speed limits that are part of every state's vehicle code. The 
difference in speed-control philosophy was reflected in then-existing speed 
laws, some of which set maximum limits, some of which simply prohibited 
speeds that were not then "reasonable and prudent." The 1930 Uniform 
Vehicle Code recommended a statewide maximum limit of 45 mph, with 
limits of 25 mph in residential districts and 20 mph in business districts. 
During the 1930s greater attention was paid to the relationship between 
speed and traffic crashes. Organized traffic-safety campaigns were 
instituted by safety groups, and state and local governments instituted 
crash-reduction programs that emphasized strict speed enforcement. 
During this time efforts were made to study the effects of speed control 
and to take a more realistic approach to the problem of inappropriate 
speed. 
During the Second World War, the shortage of rubber and gasoline led 
state governments and eventually Congress to impose a maximum 35 mph 
speed limit as an emergency conservation measure; another purpose of 
wartime speed restrictions was to save manpower by preventing traffic 
crashes (Ladd 1959). After the wartime speed limit was repealed in 1945, 
states! reverted to their essentially non-uniform speed laws.- Some states 
retained unreasonably low maximum limits, which produced pressure for 
more realistic legislation. Other states retained the llreasonable and 
prudent" standard and had no maximum limits, and this prompted public 
pressure as well. The 1956 Uniform Vehicle Code recommended a more 
realistic set of speed limits: 60 rnph (55 rnph at night), except for 30 
rnph in cities. The code also permitted appropriate authorities, such as 
highway commissions, to alter statewide limits in certain areas if justified 
by an engineering and traffic survey. As construction of the Interstate 
systern and turnpikes proceeded during the 1950s and 1960s, there was 
additional pressure for modernizing speed laws. State traffic officials 
surveyed by Webster and Guren (1966) recommended supplementing basic 
speed laws with maximum limits as high as 70 rnph on limited access 
highw'ays. 
By 1973, maximum limits of 70 rnph or more were in force on 
turnpikes and freeways in a number of states, especially in the Midwest 
and West, and several Western states had no fixed maximum limits. 
However, the Arab oil embargo led Congress to impose a national 55 rnph 
limit as an emergency conservation measure. Although fuel soon 
thereafter became plentiful (though at a considerably higher price), 
lingering concern over dwindling fuel supplies, and the discovery that 
highway deaths had decreased significantly under the lower speed limits, 
led ta retention of the 55 rnph limit. In 1978 Congress strengthened the 
enforcement of the national speed limit by increasing penalties levied 
against states with unsatisfactory compliance records. Congress has also 
appropriated millions of dollars to assist law enforcement agencies in 
achieving driver compliance. 
Meithods of Set t ing  Speed Limits. The first maximum speed l imits  
were :sometimes the result of an intuitive judgment of what speeds were 
llsafe,ll and sometimes were intended to harass automobile owners rather 
than promote safe travel. Objective methods of establishing speed zones 
have been cited since 1932, although many of these were relatively simple 
techniques (Joscelyn and Elston 1970). Carter (1949) recommended that 
speed limits be set with reference to the "pace speedf' of traffic, a 1 0  
mph band in which the majority of vehicle speeds occur. Under normal 
conditions the speed limit would be set at the highest speed within that 
band, which corresponds to the 85th percentile speed. The 85th percentile 
became the primary criterion for setting speed limits, although these limits 
were supplemented in most jurisdictions by "arbitraryv statewide or local 
maximum limits (see Oppenlander 1963). In their review of the literature 
on speed limits, Joscelyn and Elston (1970) reviewed a number of studies 
showing that the 85th percentile speed was generally recognized as the 
preferred speed limit. This speed was considered reasonable by drivers 
(since it was higher than the speed most of them would themselves select) 
and it was consistent with driversf own judgments of what speed is safe 
and prudent. Thus it avoided a common problem of earlier speed limits 
that were unreasonably low: these were frequently violated and tended to 
produce a wide-and thus unsafe-range of travel speeds. The Research 
Triangle Institute study of the relationship between speed and traffic 
crashes confirmed the reasonableness of the 85th percentile criterion, as 
did Solomon (1964). The RTI study recommended that maximum limits be 
set at the 85th percentile speed, with enforcement action to occur above 
the 95th percentile (or five to seven mph above the posted limit); and that 
minimum speeds, if desired, be set a t  the 15th percentile speed, with 
enforcement action to occur below the 5th percentile speed. The 85th 
percentile speed criterion remains in wide use, subject--since 1973-to the 
overriding national maximum speed of 55 miles per hour. 
Earlier maximum speed limits were prima facie; in other words, a 
driver who traveled faster than the posted limit could be convicted of 
speeding unless he or she could demonstrate that, given road, traffic, and 
weather conditions, his or her speed was not dangerous. Most states have 
since converted from prima facie to absolute speed limits: exceeding an 
absolute speed limit is an offense regardless of whether the speed was 
tTsafeu under the circumstances. In most states the absolute maximum 
limits are supplemented by provisions of the "basic speed lawn that cover 
speeds below the maximum limits that are nonetheless unsafe because of 
ice, f'og, heavy traffic, and the like. Basic speed laws frequently contain 
provisions requiring a driver to be able to stop within the "assured clear 
distance ahead." This enables the police to cite a driver whose vehicle 
strikes the rear of another vehicle. 
The 55 mph national maximum speed limit was enacted by Congress 
in 19'73 as an emergency conservation measure following the Arab oil 
embargo and the resulting fuel shortage. (Actually, Congress required that 
the states enact 55 mph limits or face economic sanctions.) While the 55- 
mph limit was enacted as a fuel-conservation law, similar to the wartime 
speed limits in 1942-45, studies of its safety impact showed that traffic 
fatalities declined as speed limits and travel speeds decreased. In the 
years preceding passage of the national maximum speed limit, the annual 
traffic! fatality count averaged 55,000; in 1974, the death toll was 46,402 
and the fatality count for subsequent years remained below 50,000 through 
1977. The death rate per 100 million vehicle miles traveled was 4.6 in 
1972 and 4.28 in 1973; it declined to 3.44 in 1974 and has remained below 
that figure since then (National Safety Council 1980). That reduction in 
fatalities and fatality rates followed a reduction in the speed limit is 
consistent with the experience of other countries: the establishment of 
speed limits in parts of Sweden during 1960-61 (Swedish Council on Road 
Safety undated; Road Safety Commission 1961), and in Finland during 1966 
(Hakkinen and Leppanen 1968) was followed by a reduction in traffic 
deaths. Two international conferences, reported by Smeed (1961) and Prisk 
(1967)!, respectively, studied the speed-crash relationship. It was found that 
maximum speeb limits reduced the amount of travel at excessively high 
speeds, and narrowed the range of travel speeds. It was also found that 
high speeds, per se, were associated with high crash rates. Campbell 
(1965) compared the fatality rates on California freeways with that of the 
Indiancipolis 500-mile race and found the latter to have a per-mile fatality 
rate more than 1,000 times that of freeway travel. Among the factors 
cited lfor the high death rate associated with auto racing was the increased 
risk of' striking another vehicle or a fixed object at high speeds, as well as 
a wider distribution of speeds. Not only do maximum speed limits tend to 
reduce the number of crashes caused by wide speed distributions and loss 
of vehicle control, but they reduce the force of traffic crashes in crashes 
that occur. It was reported as early as 1913 (in an article that appeared 
in Scientific American) that the destructive effects of a traffic crash 
increase in proportion to the square of the vehicle's speed. A crash at 70 
mph is nearly twice as damaging as one at 50 mph, because twice as much 
energy is dissipated. 
McClintock (1925) was one of the earliest advocates of minimum speed 
l imits; he urged a minimum limit of one-half the legal maximum to 
promote the flow of traaffic and avoid congestion. When limited-access 
highways became frequent, traffic officials advocated minimum speed limits 
of 40 to 45 miles per hour that would narrow the range of travel speeds 
and promote safety (see Webster and Gruen 1966). Today, expressways in 
most jurisdictions have minimum speeds. In addition, states1 basic speed 
laws contain a broad prohibition of unreasonably slow speeds on any 
highway. 
In sum, most jurisdictions have several laws defining unsafe speeds and 
providing for the punishment of speed offenders. The first such law is the 
"basic speed law" that generally prohibits speeds that are too fast or too 
slow under the conditions. The second speed law imposes maximum 
statewide limits (subject to the 55-mph national maximum speed limit) as 
well as maximum limits for designated classes of roads (such as limited- 
access and rural highways, residential streets, and school zones). Provision 
is made for the adjustment of maximum limits when necessary. Most 
0 
maximum speed limits are absolute, which means proof of a speed in 
excess of the applicable limit is sufficient to convict; a few states retain 
prima facie limits that allow a driver to escape conviction by proving that 
his or her speed was reasonable under the circumstances. Finally, many 
states imposed minimum limits for limited-access highways under normal 
driving conditions. Violating any of the speed laws is a criminal or 
criminal-like offense in most states: The suspected speeder is stopped by 
a police officer and either taken into custody or issued a citation in lieu 
of arrest. In most states, if the driver contests guilt, a trial governed by 
most of the rules of criminal procedure and evidence is held in a court of 
law. Penalties imposed upon those found guilty commonly include fines 
and the assessment of violation points on the offender's driving record. 
While jail is a possible sanction in about half the states, jail sentences are 
rarely imposed on convicted speeders. In all jurisdictions there exists some 
procedure by which courts report convictions to the driver-licensing agency, 
POLICE ENFORCEMENT OF SPEEDING LAWS 
In our society the legal approach based on the concept of deterrence is 
relied on as the primary strategy for managing the risk created by 
speeding. While there are many risk management systems of greater or 
lesser formality in our society (they include insurance companies, health 
care delivery systems, and family groups, for example), one system is 
primarily responsible for managing the speed-crash risk in particular as 
well as the traffic-crash risk in general. That system, the Traffic Law 
Systern, was described by Joscelyn and Jones (1972) and offered as a 
conceptual framework for studying the traffic crash problem (See Joscelyn 
and Jones 1978). In functional terms, the four functions of the TLS are 
law generation, enforcement, adjudication, and sanctioning. The preceding 
section dealt with laws designed to deter drivers from driving a t  
inapprSopriate speeds. This section describes the methods of enforcing 
those speed laws, and the procedures used to determine guilt or innocence 
of accused speed offenders and sanction those found guilty. 
Enforcement, in turn, is one of four top-level functions that police 
agencies perform in the course of providing police traffic services. Other 
functions include accident management and investigation; traffic direction 
and control; and general motorist services (Fennessy et al. 1968). The 
purpose of enforcement is to discourage drivers who are caught and 
punishled for traffic violations from committing further violations (special 
deterrence); and to discourage members of the driving public, punished or 
not, from committing unsafe driving acts for fear of being caught and 
punished (general deterrence). Special deterrence involves surveillance of 
traffic, detecting offenders, apprehending them, and conducting various 
presanctioning and sanctioning activities. General deterrence is promoted 
by increasing the intensity of enforcement, both actual and perceived. 
General Deterrence Countermeasures 
Although police enforcement activity is aimed at special deterrence of 
offenders, it also supports and creates general deterrence. Regarding 
general deterrence, the most obvious way of increasing the atmosphere of 
police presence is to increase the actual intensity of enforcement by 
placing more police units on the road. This has its limitations, because 
funds and personnel available to most departments is limited. 
The police enforcement process starts  with the placement of 
enforcement units at locations where they can influence traffic flow. 
Ideally, the objective is to select the procedures and resources and use 
them at times and places to minimize overall crash risk in a jurisdiction. 
Most police agencies approach this problem subjectively, using experience 
supported by violation and crash data to determine where and when to 
place enforcement units. Their final decisions on deployment are strongly 
influenced by practical operational constraints, such as the resources 
available and the need to enforce other traffic as well as criminal laws. 
When more formal deployment methods are used, they are usually a 
part of some selective enforcement scheme. It is based on the principle 
that patrol units should be allocated as a function of the number of 
crashes (or sometimes violations) of various types that occur at different 
times in a jurisdiction. Traffic volume may also be a factor. Often the 
function in question is judgmentally determined, and when it is not, it is 
usually linear. Some agencies (for example, the Tucson, Arizona Police 
Department) use computers to keep track of crashes and violations at 
different locations, but less formal tools--such as pin maps or even 
officers1 judgment and experience-are more common. Some agencies with 
selective enforcement programs use indices based on workload or a 
jurisdictionls total l1hazardl1 to determine when and where resources are to 
be deployed. A few agencies use algorithm or llcookbookll procedures to 
determine deployment, and a few have used computerized information 
systems. 
In general, the traffic safety effect of the different deployment 
methods is not known. An evaluation of federally sponsored selective- 
enforcement programs (PRC Public Management Services, Inc. 1974) found 
that a vpatrol-and-citen strategy using selective enforcement methods 
reduced traffic crashes; the evaluation did not, however, study other 
deployment schemes and thus it  is not known what fraction of the 
observed crash reduction was caused by selective enforcement alone. 
Another means of promoting general deterrence is to increase the 
perceived level of enforcement without substantially increasing the actual 
enforcement level. The chief strategy of increasing perceived enforcement 
is public information and education, or PI&E. Mass media campaigns 
carried out by police agencies and safety groups "spread the wordtf about 
enforcement activity and encourage compliance with the law. Some police 
agencies believe that the recent widespread use of citizensf band (CB) 
radio has helped promote general deterrence; however, other departments 
object 'to CB because it alerts unsafe drivers to enforcement activity and 
reduces the overall credibility of the enforcement threat. 
Another means of increasing perceived enforcement is to manipulate the 
use of enforcement symbols, patterns and configurations of patrol, and 
vehicle types. Patrol vehicles generate different deterrent threats, 
depending on their attention-getting properties and the degree to which 
they are associated with enforcement action. Automobiles, motorcycles, 
and a-ircraft are used as patrol vehicles, and police officers sometimes 
patrol on foot. 
A1:L law enforcement agencies make use of marked patrol cars as 
patrol vehicles (Darwick 1977). These vehicles are usually four-door 
police-package patrol sedans that may or may not be equipped with radar. 
Motorcycles are usually used with either hand-held or vehicle-mounted 
radar units operated by the cycle rider. Motorcycle operators also work 
with marked patrol cars or other cycles (Darwick 1977). Although 
motorcycles are not used as extensively as patrol cars, Booth (1978) has 
found that they are more easily recognizable as enforcement vehicles. 
Aircraft are sometimes used by traffic enforcement agencies. The 
types of aircraft most commonly used for traffic patrol are fixed-wing and 
short takeoff and landing airplanes, and helicopters (Darwick 1977). The 
greatest advantage of aircraft is the ability to cover vastly more territory 
than a conventional ground unit (Rasmussen 1977). Moreover, signs are 
often present on selected highways to advise drivers that the road is 
patrolled by aircraft. Measured miles are marked on the pavement so 
aircraft can pace speeding drivers and report them to ground units, 
Foot patrol is not commonly used by enforcement agencies. It appears 
to be most useful in urban locations, where highway conditions are not 
conducive to parking a patrol vehicle safely (Darwick 1977). 
Most departments favor conspicuousl~ marked and placed patrol cars, 
reasoning that this increases their general-deterrence potential. 0 ther 
departments, such as the Maryland State Police, favor covert strategies, 
such as the use of rented vehicles and unconventional vehicles in 
enforcement to give the impression that any vehicle on the highway could 
be a police vehicle. A study of current procedures used in speed 
enforcement, reported bv Ruschmann et al, (19801, found no consistent 
rationale or policv with respect to the selection, marking, and placement 
of vehicles and equipment. 
One promising strategy for increasing perceptions of enforcement 
intensitv is to use scheduling techniques for patrol vehicles that achieve 
the maximum carryover effect of police presence. This strategy, which 
was used in Texas and reported by Brackett and Edwards (19771, is not, 
however, in common use today. 
Special-Deterrence Countermeasures 
Special-deterrence countermeasures, like general-deterrence 
countermeasures, begin with the deployment of ~ a t r o l  vehicles and the 
selection of a patrol strategy. Because special deterrence focuses on 
individual violators of speed laws, it is necessarv for the police to identify 
violators and to collect evidence that will support a finding of their guilt. 
A variety of speed-measuring devices are in use for that purpose. 
Speed-Measurement Devices. As recentlv as twentv vears ago, 
pacing was the principal means of determining vehicle speeds. The 
proceldure is still used todav, though not as extensivelv (Darwick 1977;  
Witheford 1970). The more common form of pacing is speedometer 
pacing in which the officer selects a suspect vehicle and adjusts the 
patrol car speed to that of the suspect; when both vehicles are traveling 
at the same speed, the officer will look at the speedometer and determine 
the speed of both vehicles. There is a variation of the pacing technique 
in which the officer holds the patrol car at a steady pace (for example, at 
the speed limit or five miles per hour above it) and determines whether 
the srlspect vehicle is Ifpulling away," in which case enforcement action 
will occur (Darwick 1977). 
In a few locations, especially California, odometer pacing is used. In 
that procedure, the officer selects a steady pace while using the odometer 
to determine whether the distance between the suspect vehicle and the 
patrol vehicle is increasing, in which case the suspectls speed is greater 
than the patrol car speed. The change of distance is determined by 
selecting a landmark (for example, the shadow under a bridge overpass) and 
noting the change in the odometer reading as the suspect and patrol 
vehiclies pass the landmark; then selecting a second landmark and again 
noting the change in odometer readings (Darwick 1977). 
The stopwatch was perhaps the earliest speed measuring device, 
predating even the speedometer and odometer. Today its main use is in 
conjunction with speed measurements from aircraft. For aircraft speed 
surveilllance, markers are placed or painted on highways to measure fixed 
distances. Aircraft or helicopters cruise above the measured course and 
personnel aboard them clock passing traffic, determining their speeds from 
a conversion table. When the airborne personnel detect a violator, a 
description of the offending vehicle is relayed to a ground unit, which 
verifies the description and stops the vehicle. Watches are also used, but 
rather infrequently, in urban areas such as school zones where the speed 
limit is low. 
Radar, which stands for Radio Detection and Ranging, began to be 
used in speed enforcement about 1947. Radar uses the Doppler principle: 
Waves reflected off a moving object change frequency in proportion to the 
object's s~eed. Radar units emit radio waves in the direction of traffic: 
The change in frequency in these waves, which is proportional to the speed 
of the vehicle that reflects them, is converted into speed and displayed to 
the officer operating the unit (Witheford 1970). Radar units can be 
attached to patrol vehicles and operated in the moving mode, or can be 
operated in the stationary mode while attached to the vehicle, mounted 
on a tripod or bridge railing, or held in the officer's hand. Hand-held 
units are especiallv popular with motorcycle officers. 
Stationary-mode measurements are taken from approaching or receding 
traffic. To ensure accurate readings, the unit must not be moved while 
being operated. Moving mode measurements can be taken from traffic 
approaching the patrol vehicle (the more common method) or from traffic 
traveling in the same direction. In the moving mode, the change in 
frequency indicates the difference in speeds between the patrol and suspect 
vehicles: The radar unit subtracts the speed of the patrol car when i t  
approaches the suspect; and adds the patrol car speed when it is moving in 
the same direction as the suspect. Thus moving radar requires accurate 
measurement of both the difference in speeds and the patrol car speed. 
Whenever a radar unit measures speed on an angle instead of straight 
ahead or behind, a phenomenon known as cosine error results. This 
occurs because the radar unit measures the component of the target's 
speed along the line of sight between the radar and its target. The size 
of that component is proportional to the cosine of the angle between the 
radar and the target: As the angle increases, the cosine becomes less 
than one, and the measured component becomes less than the actual target 
speed. In the stationary mode, cosine error presents no serious problem, 
because it alwavs favors the driver and is not a valid defense. However, 
since moving-mode radar also measures the patrol vehicle's speed, cosine 
error could result in the undercalculation of how fast the ~a t ro l  vehicle is 
traveling, which could in  turn overcalculate the driver's speed. To 
minimize the effects of cosine error some police departments have 
instructed officers to ensure that the radar antenna is aligned with the 
patroll vehicle's direction of travel to within eight degrees (Michigan State 
Police 1979); at such an angle the cosine error is minimal. 
Research has also identified a number of other potential errors that 
occur in the operation of radar, such as ftshadowfl readings caused by large 
vehicl!es such as trucks; ffbumpingfl errors, or erroneous readings caused by 
sudden changes in the patrol car speed; ?'panningw errors caused by the 
radar unit antenna moving through its own display; llscanningw errors 
produced by improper use or placement of the antenna; and "ghostn 
readings caused by CB radios, power lines, and other nearby energy sources 
(U.S. Department of Transportation 1980). These errors are not caused by 
the scientific invalidity of radar's operating principles but rather by 
improper operation of the unit or by forces external to the unit. To 
minimize the occurrence of these errors, operators must be trained to 
recognize sources of errors and must follow proper operating procedures, 
including selecting an area free of distorting influences (Denver Police 
Department 1979; Michigan State Police 1979). It is especially important 
that 1:he operator make a visual identification of the offending vehicle if 
the radar unit indicates that a violation has occurred. Observation screens 
out most erroneous readings and fulfills the legal requirement that an 
officer view the offense and identify the offender. Because of the 
importance of viewing the offense, the "automatic lockn feature of modern 
radar units has fallen into disfavor with courts and police officials. 
VASCAR, which stands for Visual Average Speed Computer and 
Recorder, is a time-distance computer that calculates speed. It is favored 
by some departments for use when conditions are not favorable for using 
radar. To operate VASCAR the operator must feed both time and distance 
data for a given vehicle. Distance data can be fed directly if the length 
of a (course is known (for example, 500 yards between two overpasses), or 
can be measured by the VASCAR unit and then stored. Time data are 
entered by activating a switch when a suspect vehicle enters the course 
and deactivating it when the suspect completes it. Since distance divided 
by time equals speed, the quotient determined by VASCAR is the vehicle's 
speed (OfNeal 1967). VASCAR is no longer used widely because police 
departments have experienced extensive downtime problems, because of 
judicial reluctance to accept the device as evidence, and because radar is 
considered just as reliable. However, since VASCAR emits no radiation it 
cannot be found by radar detectors (Darwick 1978). 
All  of the speed detection devices in common use have to be attended 
by a human operator. Automated detection devices have been designed 
to eliminate this need. One such device, called ORBIS 111, determines 
speed using pavement sensors that determine speed by dividing the distance 
between the sensors by the time required to pass over both. If the speed 
determined by the device exceeds a preset speed, a camera attached to 
the ORBIS unit automatically photographs the offending vehicle together 
with the violation date, time, and location. Legal action is based on 
registration information obtained from the vehicle's license plate number 
(Myers and Ottman undated), ORBIS III was tested in Arlington, Texas, in 
1970-72. Most owners of speeding vehicles detected during the test were 
issued warning letters, although some owners were issued citations and 
chose to pay the fine (Vought Missiles and Space Company undated). It 
appears that the effects of ORBIS on speed were more the result of 
general deterrence among Arlington's drivers than special deterrence of 
those who were cited or warned. 
Video recording equipment has also been used to support traffic 
enforcement, especially to document impaired driving. Such equipment has 
been used infrequently to detect speeders. The equipment consists of 
portable videotape units mounted in patrol cars to film driverst behavior; 
they have zoom lenses and instant replay capability. 
Apprehension. Defining the speed limit as the 85th-percentile speed 
of traffic assures that there will be more violators than police officers; in 
addition, police officers have duties other than apprehending speeders. 
Police agencies also desire to maintain good public relations, must 
compensate for measurement errors, and generally concentrate only on the 
highest-risk speeders. All of these factors make it necessary to decide 
when to pursue and when not to pursue a speeder. 
Nearly all police agencies have speed 'ftolerancesfl: they range from 
unwritten and unofficial policies to official written guidelines, such as 
those used by the California Highway Patrol (at five miles per hour over 
the limit the officer should stop; at ten miles per hour over the officer 
shall stop and should cite) (Ruschmann et al. 1980). Thirty-one selected 
police agencies contacted regarding their speed enforcement procedures 
reported tolerances ranging from five to 15 miles per hour (Ruschmann et 
al. 1980). That range is consistent with the Research Triangle Institute 
(1970) recommendation that enforcement take place at speeds five to seven 
mph above the posted speed. In addition to speed tolerance policies, 
officers are often given discretion whether to stop, warn, or ci te ,  
depenlding on the conditions surrounding a violation (such as weather and/or 
road conditions, or the driver's 'fattitudell). 
I n  most cases the officeds) w h o  detected the speeder will also 
apprehend. This reflects the decision of most police departments to use 
the solo configurtation in which one unit both detects and apprehends. 
Sometimes a department will rely on the team configuration in which 
persoinnel in one unit neasure speeds and identify violators, and one or 
more 'fcatch'f vehicles are deployed downstream to apprehend them. 
Aircraft measurement procedures use a form of the team configuration; 
personnel aboard the aircraft measure speeds and report violators to ground 
units that stop them. 
Pursuit procedures for cooperative drivers are fairly standard among 
police agencies. The patrol vehicle is positioned behind or at the side of 
the violator's vehicle, and flashing lights or hand signals are used to signal 
the violator to stop. A siren is used only when the driver fails to respond 
to other signals. Procedures for pursuing drivers who attempt to escape 
vary c!onsiderably. Most agencies appear to rely on the officer's judgment 
for deciding when to initiate, conduct, or terminate hot pursuit. Some 
agencies place restrictions on the officer's decision (for example, pursuit is 
allowed only when the violator's speed is at least 20 mph over the limit); 
a few caution against "hot pursuitt1 or discourage it altogether. 
The pursued vehicle is pulled over to the side of the road or to the 
curb on city streets. The berm or median strip may be used on divided 
highways. Side streets are often used for pulling over vehicles detected 
speeding on busy city streets. The police car is positioned behind the 
violator one-fourth to one-third of a car width from the violator out 
toward the road. This protects the officer from oncoming traffic as he 
stands a t  the violator's vehicle, Most agencies queried have the policy 
that the violator's vehicle be approached from the driver's side, but some, 
such as the California Highway Patrol, reportedly encourage officers to 
approach from the passenger side. The officer's personal safety is the 
major factor in deciding how the approach should be made. 
The officer may check the vehicle's registration number and the driver's 
license after the stop. Some agencies do this routinely, and others do it 
only if they are suspicious of the vehicle or the driver. Typically, the 
officer asks the driver for the driver's license and explains the posted 
speed limit and the speed at which the driver was traveling. The officer 
may allow the driver to view the radar reading if radar was used for 
measuring speed. 
Presanctioning and Sanctioning, Once the officer has stopped the 
violator, he or she must decide whether to arrest, cite in lieu of arrest, or 
release the driver, Formal arrests in which the driver is taken into 
cus,tody are very rare. The most frequent outcome is the issuance of a 
citation requiring the driver to appear before a court or other adjudicatory 
agency and answer the speeding charge. In some instances, especially where 
speeding is still classified as a criminal offense, the driver is required to 
post bond or collateral to ensure appearance in court. The charged speed 
appearing on the citation is not necessarily the speed measured by the 
officer. Some agencies commonly ''round downu the measured speed, often 
to the next lower multiple of five, to account for possible measurement 
errors and other factors, such as reducing the number of violation points 
the driver will receive if convicted. 
In some instances the police officer will administer the sanction 
directly in the form of a warning rather than a citation. Police agency 
policiles on warnings vary widely. Some departments rarely issue warnings, 
while others warn half or more of all drivers they stop for speeding. In 
genensl, warnings are used infrequently, usually when the measured speed 
was not excessively over the limit or when the speed measurement 
/ 
procedure could be challenged as inaccurate. Verbal warnings are 
preferred to written warnings in speed enforcement; the written warning is 
apparently used more widely to deal with equipment violations. The few 
agencies that do issue written warnings seem to have a relatively high 
ratio of warnings to citations (Ruschmann et al. 1980). 
ADJU[lrDICATION AND SANCTIONING 
In most states speeding is still classified as a misdemeanor and the 
apprehension and prosecution of speeders are governed by the rules of 
crimiinal procedure, as well as by the constitutional guarantees of proof 
beyond a reasonable doubt and possibly jury trial and the right to a court- 
appoiiqted attorney. In most states jail is still a possible penalty for 
speeding, although jail sentences are extremely rare. In all states, a fine 
or penalty is a possible sanction, as is license suspension for repeated 
violations. In a number of jurisdictions where speeding is technically a 
crime, procedures have been developed to speed up the processing of cases. 
Procedures allowing violators who plead guilty to less risky speed offenses 
and pay fines in person or by mail are common, and some jurisdictions 
have assigned parajudicial personnel (commonly called "refereesv or 
ffcomnnissionersH) to hear and dispose of guilty and no-contest pleas 
(Rusch~mann et al. 1980). 
A growing number of states have dropped confinement to jail as a 
possib1.e penalty for speeding and thus have been able to dispense with 
rights to jury trial and appointed attorneys. Some states have allowed 
parajudicial personnel to hear cases, and others have relaxed the 
requirements for proving guilt. Two states, New York and Rhode Island, 
and the District of Columbia have transferred the adjudicatory function 
from the courts to an administrative agency (Muller, Day, and Oldham 
1980). 
In all jurisdictions, conviction rates for speeding are high, probably on 
the order of 90 percent or more of all citations that are answered by 
drivers, Fines, averaging about $50 (including court costs), are the most 
common sanction by far. Few citations are contested and therefore trials 
/ 
are uncommon; when they do occur, they last five to ten minutes. A few 
courts appear to entertain doubts about the validity of radar, in light of a 
well-publicized 1 9 7 9  Miami t r ia l  court ruling that  radar speed 
measurements cannot prove guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. However, the 
Miami ruling appears to be a minority view and most judges accept radar 
measurements taken from a properly working and correctly used device. 
Police report that speedometer pacing is generally accepted as evidence, 
though it is viewed as somewhat less accurate than radar, A few courts 
accept visual observation coupled with an expert judgment regarding speed, 
provided the officer can demonstrate his or her expertise in judging speeds. 
SPEED ENFORCEMENT NEEDS 
Common experience indicates that drivers who speed face only a small 
probability of being detected and punished. Joscelyn and Jones (1981) 
estimated that the average speeder faces one chance in 10,000 of being 
cited. This estimate is consistent with the finding of Sheehe (1963) that 
the probability of citation is one in 7,600 and with the estimate of Craig 
(1980), Commissioner of the California Highway Patrol, of one in 22,000. 
It is logical to conclude from these data that existing police resources are 
not sufficient to deal with the large number of speed violations that are 
committed. 
Joscelyn and Jones (1981) estimated how many police personnel would 
be needed to control the risk posed by one aspect of speeding, namely 
speeding too fast. They considered two definitions of speeding: first, the 
definition of speeding as an unsafe driving act, in which the top five 
percent of speeds present an unacceptably high risk of a traffic crash; and 
second, the common practice of posting speed limits (other than the 55- 
mph :speed limit) at the 85th percentile speed of traffic. The former, 
more conservative definition was used as the basis of their estimates. 
By definition, the highest five percent of all vehicle speeds are 
unacc!eptably risky (Treat et al. 1980). Translated into vehicle miles 
traveled, approximately 80 billion of the estimated 1.4 trillion miles 
traveled each year by American drivers are driven at unacceptably high 
speeds. Assuming that speeding is evenly distributed across time and 
amonlg the approximately 3 million miles of surfaced roadways in the 
United States, and that each "speeding tripn lasts ten miles, about 900,000 
instarices of excessive speed occur every hour, or on the average, every 
mile of highway has three drivers per hour who travel at excessively high 
speeds. 
Presently in the United States about 100,000 full time police officers 
perform traffic duties-including speed enforcement. Assuming that each 
officer can issue six citations per hour (a conservative upper bound for 
officelr activity) and does not have to appear in court during his or her 
regular shift, each officer can cover two miles of highway per hour, which 
means that all traffic officers working around the clock can cover only 
about 200,000 of the nation's three million miles of highways. Of course, 
no pollice officer works around the clock, and a more reasonable estimate 
is that existing police personnel can provide the equivalent of around-the- 
clock coverage of 50,000 miles of highways. Thus, to provide coverage for 
all surfaced roads in the United States, six million police officers are 
needed. 
Fortunately, the concept of deterrence does not assume or require that 
every violator be caught and punished. Rather explicitly the concept of 
deterrence is based on the principle that the punishment of some offenders 
is sufficient to deter others from committing the offense. What is not 
known, however, is how many offenders must be caught to present a 
credible deterrent threat. Research studies suggest that the "halo1* effect 
around a police unit on the highway persists for several miles in either 
direction; other research has found that significant increases in citation 
activity reduce the incidence of speeding as a reaction to perceived 
enforcement action. It would not be unreasonable to assume that citing 
one-sixth of all speeders would deter the remaining drivers from speeding; 
that being the case, the requirement for police officer strength falls from 
six million to one million. This estimate--quick and conservative as it is- 
indicates that police personnel needs are ten times present resources, In 
terms of cost, present traffic enforcement entails an estimated total cost 
of $2 billion; a tenfold increase in police strength would generate costs in 
the order of $20 billion (Joscelyn and Jones 1981). 
The implication of these data--that only a miniscule fraction of 
speeders are caught, and that on the order of a tenfold increase in police 
strength would be required to create a credible deterrent threat--is that 
present methods and present resources probably cannot bring about a 
significant increase in speed enforcement. Given current revenue problems 
a t  all levels of government, it is unlikely that a substantial increase in 
police traffic resources will soon occur. The limited existing resources and 
the low probability that they will be significantly increased indicate that 
the underlying premises of traffic law enforcement should be reexamined. 
Reexamination of expectations is especially important with respect to 
the 55-mph national maximum speed limit, The 55-mph violation is a 
highly visible one. The national speed limit is generally supported by 
safety and energy-conservation constituencies. Congress has enacted 
legislation that imposes fiscal penalties on states that do not show 
substantial compliance with the 55-mph limit. This is so even though 
conclusive and detailed data regarding the safety and conservation benefits - 
of the 55-mph limit have yet to be developed, and even though i t  is 
possible that the expenditure of police resources, as well as the added 
risks resulting from using traditional enforcement procedures to secure 
compliance with the limit, may outweigh the safety and conservation gains 
brought about by strict enforcement. Aside from the 55-mph violation, 
other speeding violations--especially those involving speeds much 
higher than those of other traffic--pose a significant safety problem. 
Violations of lower speed limits (e.g., 25 mph, 30 mph, 35 mph) also create 
risk. They occur very frequently--so frequently, in fact, that existing 
police resources cannot deal with more than a small fraction of violators. 
Again, the cost of increasing traditional police-oriented enforcement 
procedures could be greater than the benefits of such enforcement. 
Preliminary analyses suggest that it  will be impossible to achieve 
significant reductions in speedng without gross increases in the actual level 
of enforcement. Such increases--even if they are warranted by the 
corresponding benefits-are unlikely. 
EICAMINING ALTERNATIVE METHODS OF MANAGING THE 
SPEED CRASH RISE 
Examination of current police practices and the response of the driver 
to the deterrent approach does not suggest that the fundamental concept is 
flawed. In fact, it appears that relatively minimal police resources have 
been iremarkably effective in obtaining general compliance with speed laws. 
These data strongly support the continuation of present police practices 
and the concept of deterrence. The major reason why speed enforcement 
is so costly and labor intensive is that speeding is considered a crime in 
most states and an offense with many trappings of a crime in others. 
Under our legal system, a series of time-consuming procedures are required 
to ensure that the suspected speeder is given fair treatment. These 
procedures include the requirement that a highly trained police officer 
personally witness the offense and identify the offender; that the driver be 
given the opportunity to contest the charge in a court of law; and that 
guilt be established beyond a reasonable doubt and in accordance with 
formal rules of criminal procedure and evidence. Although the 
Constitution and state law impose these requirements on criminal speeding 
prosecutions, it is not necessary for states to treat speeding as criminal in 
the first place. 
Most speeding violations are relatively straightforward acts. Even 
though speeding creates risk and should be deterred, using the same 
approach to discourage speeding that is used to deter deliberately planned 
crimes seems unnecessary. Similarly, since the most common sanction is a 
relatively small fine with little social stigma attached, providing all the 
safeguards of the criminal law system seems equally unnecessary. This 
does not suggest that deliberate or reckless speeding should escape the 
attention of the formal system of criminal justice--only those speeding 
offenses that create relatively low risk compared to criminal conduct and 
that are not accompanied by criminal intent should be handled through 
noncriminal procedures. 
One suggested risk-management approach, described by Ruschmann et 
al, (1979), calls for classifying speeding as a "civil offensen similar to 
parking offenses in most localities. Under such an approach, enforcement 
would be focused on the vehicle rather than its driver. The registered 
owner-individual or corporate--of an offending vehicle would be subject to 
a civil sanction, namely a monetary penalty. Proof of an offense would 
consist of (a) evidence that a posted limit, maximum or minimum, was 
violated and (b) identity of the registered owner. Enforcement of 
sanctions (i.e., compelling payment) could be accomplished by using the 
central record systems linked to vehicle registration and titling. Penalties 
outstanding against vehicle owners would have to be paid before the 
vehicle could be reregistered or the title transferred. Unpaid penalties 
could create a lien against the vehicle, and civil process similar to 
repossession for nonpayment of an auto loan could be used to seize and 
sell vehicles on which penalties are not paid, 
Although automated detection and measuring technology is available, it 
has not been developed and implemented in the United States because 
speed offenses continue to be handled through a highly formal, legal 
approach that requires costly and time-consuming enforcement procedures. 
A small number of states, though, have taken the first step toward 
automated enforcement by treating most speeding violations as ncivillt 
rather than ?lcriminalll in nature and by transferring the responsibility for 
hearing and deciding speeding cases from the courts to specialized 
administrative agencies. Nearly half of the remaining states have to a 
greater or lesser extent removed criminal attributes from speeding offenses 
(Mullen, Day, and Oldham 1980). No state, however, has implemented a 
program of automated enforcement on other than a pilot basis, and no 
such efforts are planned for the immediate future. 
Detecting and punishing those associated with speeding, whether the 
speed violation is called a "crime," a llcivil offense," or something else, is 
the calassic negative approach to modifying behavior. Reliance on 
punist~ments to discourage speeding is based on the assumption that unsafe 
driving flows from a human decision based on a balancing of the utilities 
and disutilities of driving unsafely, The utilities or lfbenefitsu of speeding 
include, for example, saving time, relieving frustration, and experiencing 
the thrill of taking risks. The chief disutility of speeding is being involved 
in a crash and suffering an injury or financial loss, Because the possibility 
of a crash is not sufficient to influence many drivers to avoid speeding, 
society has taken action to increase the disutility of speeding by adding 
the ltaurrogately risk of being cited and punished, Sanctions administered 
through the Traffic Law System constitute the chief strategy by which 
society attempts to influence driver decisions whether to speed. When the 
Traffiic Law System attempts to manage the speed-crash risk, the risk 
management process is called "general deterrerence." 
However, negative approaches do not have to rely on the Traffic Law 
Systen?. Other risk-management systems, such as insurers, have appeal 
because they do not have to abide by the legal constraints that the 
Constitution requires. For example, an insurer can impose a rate increase 
on a speeder, based on reasonable evidence, without following the same 
strict procedural formalities required to convict a speeder in court. 
Punishments applied by any risk-management system may be actual or 
perceived; deterrence theory (and common sense) dictate that the influence 
on behavior is greatest when both actual and perceived punishments occur. 
Almost all efforts to manage the risk of unsafe driving have 
conceintrated on punishing persons who drive unsafely. This strategy, 
increiasing the  disutility of unsafe driving, adds legal or other 
punishment to the other disutilities (principally the risk of having a crash) 
of unsafe driving with the intent that it alter a decision from one to drive 
unsafely to a decision to drive safely. Increasing the disutility of unsafe 
driving is only one available means of prompting decisions to drive safely, 
Three others are: decreasing the utility of unsafe driving; increasing the 
utility of safe driving; and decreasing the disutility of safe driving. 
Decreasing the utility of unsafe driving is a strategy that in effect 
eliminates the financial and social rewards that one receives by driving 
unsafely. For example, a trucking company that pays its drivers by the 
mile rewards speeders with higher pay, more free time, or both, as 
compared with nonspeeders. Changing the company pay policy could 
eliminate these rewards and decrease the utility of speeding. 
Increasing the utility of safe driving is, in effect, the offer of a 
reward to safe drivers that is large enough to shift a decision to drive 
unsafely to one to drive safely. Assuming that nonspeeders can somehow 
be identified, they could be given monetary rewards or public recognition. 
Rewards could be both perceived (the possibility of receiving a prize) or 
actual (a safe driving certificate), Education and information efforts are 
required to support both actual and perceived rewards of safe driving, 
especially the latter. 
Decreasing the asutility of safe driving is a strategy that removes 
vpunishmentsfl associated with compliance with the speed limit. Persuading 
employers not to discipline tardy workers might eliminate the penalty a 
worker would pay if he or she obeyed posted speed limits after leaving 
late for work. Strategies to decrease incentives for disobeying the speed 
limit include informing drivers that the travel time saved by speeding is 
minimal. 
Jones and Joscelyn (1981) examined a variety of risk-management 
strategies to be directed against driver decisions to speed. They 
recommended a series of countermeasures, including the enhancement of 
traditional enforcement procedures, as well as nontradi t ional  
countermeasures that do not necessarily rely on punishment. Aside from 
automated detection and enforcement, Jones and Joscelyn recommended a 
variety of on-board detection and warning systems: an operating speed 
recorder that would alert owners of vehicles to speed violations committed 
by drivers; an on-board system that would warn passengers on buses and 
vans that the vehicle was being operated at an excessive speed; programs 
that would encourage other drivers to rebort speeders to corporate fleet 
owners and police departments or driver-licensing authorities; and 
information programs that would detail the actual increases in costs 
associated with high-speed driving and the modest increase in travel time 
that results from obeying the speed limit. These countermeasures increase 
the probability of speeders being detected; encourage persons outside 
formal risk-management systems (for example, parents) to influence driver 
decisions regarding speed; provide drivers with information helpful in 
deciding what speed to select; and rely on systems other than the Traffic 
Law System to reward compliance and punish noncompliance with speed 
laws. All of the recommended concepts appear feasible but require 
additional study prior to their being implemented. Elements of the 
recommended countermeasures pose problems of acceptability, and some of 
them (such as automated enforcement) are vulnerable to sabotage. All  of 
the concepts are potentially costly, although they may be more efficient 
than a corresponding expenditure for more police resources, Finally, 
unintentional speeding (for example, following the "pacen of leading traffic) 
may ]lot be as amenable to the countermeasures proposed by Jones and 
Joscelyn, who focused on conscious and intentional speeding. Nonetheless, 
in light of how limited existing police resources and procedures are in 
regard to reducing the speed-crash risk, implementing--or a t  least  
evaluating-the recommended countermeasures is indicated. 
RECOMMENDATIONS FOR ACTION 
The previous section has presented an overview of the speed-crash risk 
and management actions undertaken to deal with the risk. Traffic law 
enforcement has been shown effective in reducing the speed-crash risk, but 
enforcement resources are limited. Near-term management actions will 
depend upon using traffic law enforcement most effectively. Longer term 
management action will necessarily include alternative approaches. Speed 
is a highway safety problem. Action needs to be taken at the state and 
local level to support both nearterm and longer term approaches. Local 
programs that deal with the speed-crash risk should include the following 
elements. 
0 Enact and post reasonable maximum and minimum 
speed limits. Public antipathy to speed law enforcement 
stems in part from improperly established limits that make 
nonrisky behavior illegal. Improper limits also tend to 
m isallocat e police resources if they are enforced. Proper 
limits help the public select safe travel speeds, create 
respect for the law, and develop public support for 
enforcement action against those who violate the law. 
Decriminalize minor speeding offenses. Treating minor 
speeding acts as civil offenses will not reduce the deterrent 
effect of the law. It will reduce the cost of case handling 
both for the state and for the driver. Simple speeding has 
been treated as a civil offense for years in several states 
and has proved to be a workable approach, I t  also 
facilitates the administrative processing of cases (as opposed 
to processing within the judicial system) should that be 
desired. 
Enlist the aid of the media in disseminating 
information about the limited utility associated with 
speeding. Public information and education efforts have 
focused on speeding for years. Most of. the emphasis has 
been on the risks associated with unsafe driving. This 
approach is useful and should not be discontinued but it  
should be augmented by information on how little can be 
gained by speeding. Drivers need to have information on 
both the risks and the benefits to make intelligent 
decisions. 
a Implement selective enforcement programs. The value 
of a carefully targeted police traffic enforcement program 
is well established. Despite ' this knowledge, many 
departments do not have a formal program. Often this is 
so because the community places higher priorities on other 
aspects of police service, such as crime prevention. 
Citizens must demand protection from the traffic crash risk' 
as well. The police response should include a carefully 
planned program that identifies the speed-crash risk and 
allocates resources to deal with the risk. Care should be 
taken to ensure that an actual selective enforcement 
program is implemented. Merely increasing citation activity 
is not selective enforcement and may not achieve risk 
management objectives. 
0 Encourages appropriate adjudication and sanctioning 
practices. The proper disposition of speed cases is critical 
to the success of a risk management program. Low risk 
offenders can be handled summarily, with due regard to the 
need for fundamental fairness, and receive sanctions such as 
fines and accrue points towards license suspension. High 
risk offenders--such as those who engage in reckless driving, 
road racing, fleeing a police officer, or other deliberate 
unsafe speeding acts-require more than cursory at  tent ion. 
Prompt adjudication of high risk offenders and deliberate 
imposition of more severe sanctions (including license 
suspension and incarceration where warranted) are critical 
to the success of a local speed control program. It must 
be known in the community that serious offenses will be 
dealt with promptly and severely for a general deterrence 
program to be effective. 
Install speed monitoring devices on vehicles. The police 
cannot monitor all driver behavior. Society must develop 
additional control systems. Appiication of available speed 
monitoring technology should be encouraged and fostered by 
action of public agencies. Installation of speed monitoring 
devices on vehicles that transport school children, the 
handicapped, or other similar populations that are owed a 
high standard of care would be a good starting point. 
Creation of incentives such as tax credits should also be 
considered to encourage private fleet opera tors to install 
monitors. 
Increase the use of automated detection devices. 
Automated detection devices are a promising technology but 
their general use is limited by the state of the current law. 
Potential applications do exist. For example, automated 
devices could monitor speed behaviors on restricted areas 
(such as parking lots). Offending vehicles could be denied 
access as a sanction. School parking lots or other areas 
under control of public agencies may provide early 
opportunities for the application of this technology. Other 
restricted areas (including, for example, parks, private 
parking lots ,  and military bases) that are not public 
highways could also serve to develop applications of  
automated detection technology. 
Each of these approaches will promote reduction of the speed-crash risk 
in the near-term future while laying a foundation for the implementation 
of longer term approaches that do not rely as heavily on traditional labor 
intensive enforcement approaches. 
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